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ABSTRACT

This research presented here mainly focuses on analyzing investors’ reactions toward
banks’ announcement of TARP repayment. Considering huge difference among sample
banks, I split the result of abnormal return into subgroups based on banks size and
financial performance. And then I conduct comparisons of each group to reveal the
possible effects on market reactions casted by size and financial performance. To confirm
my results on market reactions to TARP repayment, I perform two regression analyses on
both full sample and subsample with cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as dependent
variable and controlled variables as independent variables. Data over the period from
2008Q4 to 2013Q4 for 196 and 175 U.S. public banks and bank holding companies is
derived from ProPublica website, CRSP data base and COMPSTAT data base. Market
model is used to calculate cumulative abnormal return and the OLS method is adopted to
run regression. In the end, I find that comparatively larger banks with relatively better
accounting performance and relatively higher capital ratios are inclined to make multiple
repayments while the comparatively smaller banks with relatively worse accounting
performance and relatively worse capital ratios are inclined to pay back loans all at once.
Also, I find that investors react positively to news on TARP repayments. Especially,
splitting the sample by various possible determinants for CARs, I find that stock market
investors remain less optimistic about comparatively larger banks with relatively better
accounting performance and relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively
smaller banks with relatively worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital
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ratios. I suggest that small and struggled companies have more potential to develop after
exiting TARP.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This paper applies event study to analyze market reactions to banks that fully or partially
repaid the U.S. Treasury’s investments in the Trouble Assets Relief Program (also known
as TARP). TARP was created out of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA)
of 2008, which was designed in response to the subprime mortgage crisis and signed into
law by President George W. Bush. The act originally authorized the U.S. Treasury
Secretary to infuse $700 billion into U.S. economy through purchasing distressed assets
from banks and other firms. Among many programs in TARP, the Targeted Investment
Program (TIP) and the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) are specific to banks and bank
holding companies. Those two programs were aimed to strengthen the capital base for
those who were generously healthy but suffered from liquidity or financial problems due
to the crisis. Specifically, CPP proposed to inject $250 billion yet, by the program’s close
on December 9, 2009, the expenditure was 45 billion less than it initial goal. There were
709 financial institutions including 707 commercial banks and bank holding companies
involved in it. Among those recipients, 282 are publicly traded. Two banks that
participated in the CPP also received capital infusions of $20 billion each from the
Targeted Investment Program (TIP). These banks were Citigroup and Bank of America.
Both CPP and TIP infused capital through publicly trading preferred stocks and warrants.
In CPP, the loans recipients agreed to pay a dividend of five percent for the first five
years and nine percent thereafter to their preferred stock holders. And warrants, which
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were attached to 15 percent of the investment and had a strike price based on the 20 day
trailing stock price, allowed the owners to purchase newly issued stock at a preset strike
or exercise price on or before the expiration date. In TIP, the loans recipients were
required to pay 8 percent dividends on preferred stocks. And warrants were attached to
10 percent of the investment and had a strike price based on the 20 day trailing stock
price. On February 17, 2009, President Barack Obama signed The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which changed the terms of TARP. This act made TARP
less attractive to many banks and enabled banks to drop out the TARP program early as
well. The ARRA’s Title VII placed restrictions on executive payments by recipients of
TARP funds. This act reduced the attractiveness of TARP for banks. Meanwhile, Title
VII, Section 7001(g) of the ARRA allowed recipients to repay their funds much earlier
than the original CPP contracts. In the original CPP contracts, banks were not permitted
to redeem their preferred stock immediately and instead they generally had to wait three
years after the initial capital injection before they could completely call back the
preferred stock. Yet, the ARRA allowed banks to exit CPP immediately if they could
issue new equity equal to or in excess of the U.S. Treasury’s investment. As for banks
that wanted to exit TARP, the amount and timing of their repayments was subject to
consultation with the appropriate federal banking agency. If the agency confirmed that a
bank would have sufficient capital after repayment, the bank could pay back the entire
CPP investment either in a lump sum or over time, as long as each payment was at least
25% of the original total investment (unless the last payment was less by default). When
returning the CPP investment, banks also had the opportunity to repurchase the warrants
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received by the Treasury at warrants’ fair market value. At the end of March 2009, four
bank holding companies firstly announced their full CPP repayments. In December 2009,
right after banks were allowed to exit TIP, Citi Bank and Bank of America repaid their
loans in full. By the end of 2013, a total of 208 publicly traded banks completely or
partially repaid the investments they had received under TARP. Repayments from
publicly held banks totaled approximately $222 billion out of $232 billion received.

In this research, I utilize the market model over the period 2008Q4-2013Q4 to calculate
abnormal return for 196 banks in the full sample and 175 banks in the subsample. I split
the result of abnormal return into subgroups based on banks size and financial
performance. Then I conduct a comparison analysis to reveal the possible effects on
market reactions by size and financial performance. To confirm my results on market
reactions to TARP repayment, I conduct regressions on two subsamples with cumulative
abnormal return as dependent variable and other variables as right-hand-side variables.

I find that comparatively larger banks with relatively better accounting performance and
relatively higher capital ratios are inclined to make multiple repayments while the
comparatively smaller banks with relatively worse accounting performance and relatively
worse capital ratios are intended to pay back loans in full. Also, I find that investors react
positively to news on TARP repayments. Especially, splitting the sample by various
possible determinants for CARs, I find that stock market investors remain less optimistic
about comparatively larger banks with relatively better accounting performance and
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relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively smaller banks with relatively worse
accounting performance and relatively worse capital ratios. I suggest that small and
struggled companies have more potential to develop after exiting TARP.
1.2 Organization
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I review previous’
researches focusing on TARP. In section 3, I introduce the process of data collection. I
describe the methodology in section 4. In Section 5, I provide the results of this research.
In section 6, I present the conclusion and summary of the results described.

4

SECTION 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

In this sector, my purpose is to give a comprehensive overview of important findings of
previous studies. Because TARP may will be the largest government intervention in
banking since the Great Depression, related researches has attracted considerable
attentions. Most of this research addresses which banks enter or are selected for TARP.
Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) explored the basic characteristics of banks that
received capital investment by separately conducting regression in three distinctive
decision making processes (banks’ application submission decision, the U.S. Treasury’s
approval decision and banks’ rejection decision). They concluded that compared to other
banks involved in TARP, banks that were larger in size, had derivatives exposures,
weaker capital ratios and unstable funding profiles, were more exposed to systemic risk,
and had significantly stronger asset quality. Taliaferro (2009) reached similar result by
investigating the characteristics of the CPP participants from the angel of their target
capital structures. This study found that banks with high leverage and facing a high cost
of a regulatory downgrade were more likely to involve in CPP, as were banks with
likelihood to increase lending. Aside from banks’ characteristics, their political
connections also raised massive attentions among scholars studying factors influence
TARP allocation. Contrary to Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) who found no
connection between political connections and Treasury’s decisions, Duchin and Sosyura
(2010) argued that banks’ political connections cast a strong effect on their access to
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government capital. Li (2010) included banks’ campaign contributions, committee
assignments, ideology and connections with the Federal Reserve System as potential
TARP distribution factors in his study. He found that apart from ideology, the other three
political factors had significant effect on TARP distribution. Another possible factor
considered as critical for TARP participation by many scholars was CEO compensation
limitations. Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) believed that the restrictions over
executive salary in H.R.1586 played an important role in the capital infusion process and
they considered it as an associated political interference cost of TARP. Cadman et al.
(2010) found that banks with higher levels of CEO pay were more likely to reject TARP
funds.
The other major stream of literature on TARP has focused on market reactions to the
announcement of TARP. Duchin and Sosyura (2009) found that banks experienced
significant valuation gains only when the government announced the TARP instead when
the U.S. Treasury announced selection decisions and when bank announced its respond to
Treasury’s decision. Kim (2010) observed negative market reactions to banks making
announcement to restrict CEOs’ payments, especially for those larger size and better
performing banks. Elyasiani, Mester and Pagano (2013) investigated investors’ reactions
to financial instructions’ announcements of capital infusions through TARP injections.
They found that investors reacted positively to TARP. Investors’ reactions to TARP were
significantly related to the bank’s prior financial condition including profitability,
capitalization, and size. Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) found no negative
information about financial health of banks associated with TARP capital infusion.
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Aside from focusing on initial distribution, several empirical studies have evaluated the
effects of TARP on bank lending, capital adequacy and bank risk taking. Examples
include Philippon and Schnabl (2009), Wilson (2009), Wilson and Wu (2010), Li (2010),
Taliaferro (2009) and Black and Hazelwood (2012). Some of them claimed that the
TARP investment did induce additional lending. Others argued that most of the TARP
funds were used to fill capital holes, as opposed to supporting new lending.
However, currently there is very limited literature that discovers banks’ TARP repayment;
though more than 90 percent of infusion funds have been repaid. Bayazitova and
Shivdassani (2009) indicated that banks which repaid CPP infusions tended to be larger,
have stronger capital ratios, and better asset quality than banks that continued to receive
TARP support. Besides, they focused that executive compensation as a strong
determinant of whether a bank repays TARP funds. In addition, they also found that on
average TARP repayments were associated with significantly positive announcement
returns in 2009. Wilson and Wu (2010) investigated the characteristics of the banks that
fully or partially repaid TARP. They found that larger banks that raised private capital in
2009, banks that had better earnings performance in 2008, and banks that have fewer
problem assets are significantly more likely to have exited TARP early. Also, CEO pay
restrictions associated with TARP investments have often been reasons cited for why
banks paid back government capital early. Li and Tehranian investigated how the precrisis health of banks is related to the probability of repaying, or missing a dividend
payment on TARP funds. They concluded that repaying banks are those that see
performance improvements during the time they hold TARP funds and that all banks
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involved in TARP have liquidity problems. Although Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009)
even applied event study on repayment decision of CPP during 2009 and they found
overall positive market reactions to this decision, for the reasons of limited time periods,
incomplete data and unsatisfied outcomes, investors’ reactions to banks repayment
decisions need to be fully explored
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SECTION 3
Data
3.1 Sample selection
By February 2014, 515 out of 758 the TARP involved banks have fully or partially repaid
the funds and another 145 banks are required to pay back in the future. Indeed, as
discussed in section 2, as the TARP program progressed many banks realized that the
costs of participating in TARP were higher than had been expected and decided to pay
back loans from government. I cumulate detailed information about TARP recipients
including the amount of committed and returned funds, warrants, and dividends interest
as well as the date of TARP entry and exit from the website called ProPublica1, which is
a non-profit journalism site that tracks TARP recipients.
Among all those non-failed banks, I include only commercial banks and bank holding
companies traded publicly through exchanges and with accessible stock price data in this
study. After deleting private banks, acquired banks, OTC-traded banks or community
development banks and banks with missing important information, the sample size is
narrowed to 196 for all available banks and 175 for banks with one repayment only.
Among them, for those banks experienced mergers, their daily stock return data might
incomplete after mergers. Yet I still keep them in the sample as long as their mergers
happened after repayments were announced enough data to calculate abnormal returns.
To predict and analyze market reactions, I collect banks’ daily stock market return data
and overall market returns (CRSP value-weighted return) data from 2008 Q4 to 2013 Q4

1

ProPublica’ website: http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/category/Bank
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from CRSP. Although the TARP nominally target on relatively healthy banks, its
recipients are various in size and their financial performance, especially after May 13,
2009 when Secretary Geithner announced that the Treasury planned to reopen the
application window for participation in the CPP for banks with total assets under $500
million. Besides, the difference between banks and bank holding company is quite large
so that might attract different market reactions.
Taking all those factors in consideration, I decide to separately analyze market reactions
to each bank according to bank’s performance and financial characteristics. To meet this
goal, I collect Banks’ quarterly financial data between 2008Q4 and 2013Q4 from
COMPASTAT. Considering data consistency, I use uniformed company’s CUSIP codes
to match them together. And then I segregate the data according to different
characteristics in general. Following Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and
Federal Reserve guidelines, I divide banks into five size groups based on quarter-end
2008Q4 book value of assets: i) less than $500 million; ii) between $500 million and $1
billion; iii) between $1 billion and $3 billion; iv) between $3 billion and $10 billion; and
v) greater than $10 billion. Besides, I also separate banks based on frequencies of their
repayments. Specifically, I define "one-time-only-banks" as those banks that repaid loans
once in full and "multiple-times-banks" as banks that make multiple repayments in
research period.

10

3.2 Event date
I use the day when banks announced their TARP repayment as the event day.Yet, It is
impossible to use their TARP repayment announcement date as the event date for banks
experience mergers and repayments at the same day or in the day after. Hence, I adjust
the event day to the first day when the merger announcement is made, which covers
detailed TARP repayment plan. Besides, since my study is based on daily stock data, I
employ a 3-day event window (-1, +1) around the event date as an adjustment to
information leaking or lagging. In addition, I utilize the 143 trading day period (around
six month) prior to the event window as the estimation window, which maintained data
sufficiency and reduced overlap bias as well.
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SECTION 4
METHODOLOGY
4.1 Abnormal Returns
I use classic market model to estimate abnormal returns for the 3-day event window
around each event date. The models are as follows:
Rit’=αi+βiRmt’ +εit’
E(εit’)=0 Var(εit’)= σεit’2
Where Rit’ is the daily stock logarithm return2 for a bank i at time t’ (t’ belongs to each
estimation window), Rmt’ is the daily market logarithm return (CRSP value-weighted
return) at time t’ and εit’ is an unobserved error term. Generally, ordinary least squares
(OLS) method that I adopt is a common regression method to estimate the market model
parameters.
ARit= Rit-E(Rit)= Rit -^α -^β Rmt
i

i

Where ARit is the abnormal return (logarithm form) for a bank i at time t (t belongs to
event window). E(Rit) is expected return (logarithm form) estimated by the market model.
αi and βi are coefficients estimated by the market model.
Since it is important to make overall inference for the event of interest, the abnormal
return should be aggregated. The aggregation is along two dimensions which are over
time and beyond security. I decide to contemplate aggregation over time first. Hence,
after calculating abnormal return for each firm, I compute three-day window (-1, 1)

2

Rit’=log(1+r it’)=log(

∑

)=log(rit2)-log(rit1)

=log(1+rit1)+ log(1+rit2)+……+ log(1+ritn)=log(pn)-log(p0)
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cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for every sample firm.
CARi(t1,t2)=∑

=

CARi(-1, 1)= ∑

ARit
=−

ARit

Var (CAR(-1,1))= (t2-t1+1)σ i2
After aggregate abnormal return across different time period, it is time to cumulate it in
the other dimension (through various securities). So, I calculate average cumulative
abnormal return (ACAR).
ACAR(t1,t2)=N ∑ = CARi(t1,t2)
ACAR(-1,1)=N ∑𝑁= CARi(-1,1)
Var (ACAR(-1,1))=𝑥 = N2 ∑𝑁= σi2
Under the null hypothesis (H0) that the event of interest casts no effect on the real returns,
the distribution of the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) is
ACAR(-1,1)~N(0, Var (ACAR(-1,1)))
Given the null distribution of ACAR, tests of null hypothesis can be conducted. I conduct
t-tests to determine whether ACAR is significantly different from zero.
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4.2 Comparison Analysis
In many situations, market reaction to the same event can be different among different
companies. Hence, considering sample banks are various in sizes, financial
characteristics and operating performances, I separate the sample into subgroups and
conduct descriptive analysis and calculate ACAR for each group. The accounting based
measures are as follows. Tier 1 capital ratio indicates the banks’ capital adequacy.
Liquidity ratio indicates the banks’ current and contingent cash position. Return on assets
indicates how profitable the banks are. Nonperforming asset to total assets and Provisions
for loan losses to total asset indicates the banks’ loan composition and performance.Netcharge offs to total assets indicates the banks’ bad debts composition and the recovery
performance, Common shares issued to total assets indicates the amount of banks’ new
issued common shares regarding to their total assets. Repayment amount to total assets
indicates the banks’ TARP repayments proportion of total assets ，Merger indicates
whether banks have gone through merger, Pay all indicates the probability of the banks
having repaid all TARP loans during the research period.
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4.3 Regression Analysis
In order to confirm and explore about results from the event studies in the previous
section, I conduct the following regressions using each bank's quarterly CAR as a
dependent variable and using several financial performing factors that can influence
market reactions as independent variables.
CARi=α+β1 Tier 1 capital ratio +β2 Liquidity ratio +β3 Return on assets +β4Ln(Total
Assets)+β5Net Charge-offs to total assets+β6 Nonperforming asset to total assets +β7
Provisions for loan to total asset +β8 Common share issued to total assets +β9 Merger+β10
Repayment amount to total assets +ε
Where CARi is quarterly CAR of bank I, Tier 1 capital ratio is Risk-adjusted tier 1 capital
divided by total assets, Liquidity ratio is Cash and short-term investment divided by total
assets, Return on assets is Net income after tax divided by total assets, Ln(Total Assets) is
the natural logarithm of total assets, Net Charge-offs to total assets is the reported amount
of asset write-downs minus recoveries of previous write downs and then divided by total
assets, Nonperforming asset to total assets is loans and other assets that are 90 days or
greater past due divided by total assets, Provisions for loan to total asset is the charged
against earnings to establish a reserve sufficient to absorb expected loan losses based
upon knowledge of the loan portfolio divided by total assets, Common share issued to
total assets is bank’s common share issued divided by total assets, Merger is a dummy
variable indicate whether the bank has gone through mergers, Repayment amount to total
assets is the amount of TARP repayment normalized by the asset in order to avoid the
size effect.
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SECTION 5
RESULTS
5.1 Distribution results
Table 1 shows the detail information about the sample banks’ TARP entrance and exit
between 2008Q4 to2013Q4. Specifically, according to figure1, which demonstrates the
distribution of TARP issuance by frequency, 134 out of 196 the sample banks enter in the
TARP in 2008Q4, which is the first and largest TARP entrance period. The next peak for
TARP entrance is 2009Q1 when 57 banks announce to receive the loans from the U.S.
Treasury. By the CPP closed on December 31, 2009, only 5 banks join the program.
Among of them, 3 banks enroll after the CPP reopened on May 13 2009. Similarly, from
figure 2, which tracks the distribution of TARP issuance by amount, it is obvious that
most of the TARP funds are distributed in 2008Q4 and a relatively small amount of loans
distributed from 2009Q2 to 2009Q4. Yet, unlike figure 1, no significant amount of loan is
issued in 2009Q1, though many banks entered the TARP at that time.
Figure 3 and 4 vividly demonstrate the distribution of the TARP repayments by the
sample banks. The start of the TARP exit is in 2009Q1. After ARRA signed into law in
February 2009, four bank holding companies (Marin Bancorp., Iberiabank Corp., Old
National Bancorp., and Signature Bank) announce their full repayment on March 31 2009.
According to figure 3, more banks, 33 out of 175, repay their loans in 2011Q3 than any
other quarters. Meanwhile, based on of U.S. Treasury’s tracker3, a total of 45 institutions
repurchase all or part of their outstanding CPP preferred shares in August 2011. However,
3

U.S. Treasury TARP tracker: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARPTracker.aspx
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in figure 4 which tracks the distribution of TARP repayment by amount, the total amount
of TARP repayments in this period is not particularly large. The second peak of TARP
repayments is 2009Q2, which has 22 banks paying back. During this period, ten of the
largest banks in TARP’s CPP are approved and pay back $68 billion loans, according to
U.S. Treasury. Similarly, figure 4 shows this quarter has the second largest amount of
money returned. The third and fourth peaks in figure 3 are 2012Q2 and 2009Q4.
Comparison with figure 4 shows that only 2009Q4 has a significant amount of money
returned. In December 2009, all of the TIP funds were returned according U.S.
Treasury’s TARP tracker. Banks not completely paying back their loans by 2009Q4
would be subject to the executive compensation restrictions in 2010.
5.2 Descriptive statistics results
Table 3 displays the characteristics of both “one-time-only-banks” and “multiple-timesbanks”. Generally, the total assets of both groups are highly skewed. The median values
of total assets are $2.21 billion and $2.58 billion. Yet, the average values of total assets
are $55.00 billion and $99.17 billion in assets. In this case the average values are ten
times bigger than the median values. The mean and median of the natural logarithm of
assets are similar indication that the skewness of assets is consistent with a log normal
distribution at least in this aspect. Besides, repayment amount to total assets of both
groups are highly skewed as well. The median bank of each group in the sample has 1.66%
and 1.78% in this ratio. Yet, the average bank of each group has 97.72% and 5.24%
separately in this ratio. Specifically, compared to “multiple-times-banks”, “one-timeonly-banks” has less total assets, slightly less profitability as measured by return on assets,
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slightly lower capital adequacy as measured by the risk adjusted tier 1 capital ratios,
slightly higher current and contingent cash position capital adequacy as measured by the
liquidity ratios, slightly higher loan proportion in assets as measured by nonperforming
asset to total assets ratios, slightly less performance of recovery bad debts, and last but
not least higher amount of repayment as measured by repayment amount to total assets an.
However, “one-time-only-banks” shares huge difference on total assets with “multipletimes-banks” and most of control variables are based on total assets. Hence, aside from
difference on total assets between two groups, only differences on nonperforming assets
to total assets, difference on repayment amount to total assets and difference one merger
should be taken into consideration. Thus, I conclude that banks in group of “one-timeonly-banks” are relatively smaller, bearing more amounts of loan, with more amounts of
repayment and probability of going through a merger than “multiple-times-banks”.
5.3 Event study results
Table4 shows the descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for “onetime-only-banks” and “multiple-times-banks”. Generally, stock market investors react
positively to bank’s TARP repayment announcement. Possible explanations might be that
the approval of exiting TARP conveys positive information about the financial health of
the banks or that getting rid of restrictions on CEO’s compensations avoids top talents
drift. This result is consistent with the view of Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) 4 .
Besides, the CAR is highly skewed. In addition, compared with “multiple-times-banks”,
“one-time-only-banks” have slightly higher CAR and standard deviation of CAR. Thus,
4

Bayazitova and Shivdassani also detect positive market reactions to banks’ TARP repayments even
though they believe the initial capital injection does not appear to contain a certification effect.
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banks with only one TARP repayment in research period get a larger positive market
reaction than banks with multiple TARP repayment. Yet, the different between two
groups is not significant though.
Table 5 reports the comparison analysis results of average cumulative abnormal return
(ACAR). As for “one-time-only-banks”, all of ACARs under each control variable are
positive and significantly different than zero. Thus, stock market investors reacted
positively to “one-time-only-banks” TARP repayment announcement. However, banks
from “multiple-times-banks” have negative ACAR values under several control variables
and all of the significant t tests are failed. Those negative ACAR values might be related
to small sample size and hence cannot change the result that investors react positively to
both “one-time-only-banks” and “multiple-times-banks". In fact, those negative ACAR
reveal that controlled variables have different effect on market reactions for “one-timeonly-banks” and “multiple-times-banks”. Among most of vertical control variables, “onetime-only-banks” have slightly higher ACAR than “multiple-banks”. This fact consists
with the statistical result on CAR in table 4. In vertical comparison, “one-time-onlybanks” with relatively more nonperforming assets, lower liquidity level, more provisions
for loans, more net charge offs and more merger or acquisition actions get more
optimistic market reactions than the counterpart. “Multiple-times-banks” with relatively
higher total assets, higher returns on assets, higher tier 1 capital ratio get more optimistic
market reactions than the counterpart. Thus, for “one-time-only-banks”, stock market
investors remain less optimistic about comparatively larger banks with relatively better
accounting performance and relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively
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smaller banks with relatively worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital
ratios. This result appears to be confusing but sensible on a second thought. It is well
known that stock price doesn't only reflect a company's current value but also reflects the
growth that investors expect in the future. To pay back TARP loans and therefore to
avoid higher dividend rate, most of those struggled small companies choose to merger
with other banks to gain both geographic and economic improvement. Those acts of
struggle to survive and to turn a year-end report from red to black are more promising in
investors’ eye than acts are undertaken by well-performed banks to just avoid intense
public scrutiny. 5 However, for “multiple-times-banks”, stock market investors remain
more optimistic about comparatively larger banks with relatively better accounting
performance and relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively smaller banks
with relatively worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital ratios. Besides,
although new common share issuing conveyed positive information about banks capital
capacity and met ARRA requirement, it will dilute current shares’ value which investors
are holding as well. Hence, investors reacted more positively to banks (both “one-timeonly-banks” and “multiple-times-banks”) with less new issued common shares.
5.4 Regression results
Table 6 displays the result of regression analysis that I conduct to confirm the results
from the event studies in the previous section. In this table, all the signs in both models
are consistent with the results from the event studies. Other than that, both models are not
estimated well with little R square and most of coefficients are insignificant. And that

5

Explanations based on few journalism reviews.
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might help to explain those confusing information conveyed by models’ coefficients and
reveal the limits of this research. Firstly, the valuation impact and explanation power of
repaying CPP infusions might be underestimated due to substantial media and equity
analyst focus and speculation about the possibility of redemption. For instance, in a
highly publicized research report release on March 11, 2009 Goldman Sachs predicted
eight banks would repay TARP capital, which are around 3 to more than 12 months
before the official announcement came out. In this case, those cumulative abnormal
returns calculated by a 3-day event window might not precisely reveal the real market
reaction to this event. Meanwhile, market investors might use financial performance data
on different quarter rather than what I used in this research.
Last but not least, limits on data availability might also contribute to results insignificant
and poor explanation power. The sample in this research only covers 196 banks, which is
a relatively insufficient to predict and estimate reactions in excessive violent stock market.
Besides, one of the data sources of this research (COMPASTAT) only covers few
quarterly financial data under general categories. Those specific data from bank and
financial institution focused categories are unavailable for me. In the end, group of “onetime-only-banks” has 175 banks but group of “multiple-times-banks” has 21 banks. The
huge group size different might decrease the power of comparison results. Hence, I
cannot find enough control variables to precisely explain the market reactions.
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SECTION 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I use 196 TARP recipients that have fully or partially repaid the funds as the full sample.
Among them, 175 TARP recipients are in full and other 21 TARP recipients are with
multiple repayments. From my research, I find that comparatively larger banks with
relatively better accounting performance and relatively higher capital ratios are inclined
to make multiple repayments while the comparatively smaller banks with relatively
worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital ratios are intended to pay
back loans all at once. Also, I find that investors react positively to news on TARP
repayments. Possibly, investors treat TARP exit as a positive signal on the banks’
financial health or as a relief from restrictions on CEO’s compensations and from top
talents drift. From this point, positive reactions from investors are reasonable. Especially,
splitting the sample by various possible determinants for CARs, I find small market
reactions for comparatively larger banks with relatively better accounting performance
and relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively smaller banks with relatively
worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital ratios. I suggest that small
and struggled companies have more potential to develop after exiting TARP. To pay back
TARP loans and therefore to avoid higher dividend rate, most of those struggled small
companies chose to merger with other banks to gain both geographic and economic
improvement. Hence, a more positive market reaction to small and struggled banks’
TARP exit is quite reasonable as well.
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Table 1. Sample firms
Name
1st Constitution Bancorp
1st Source Corp
Alliance Financial Corp
Ameris Bancorp
AmeriServ Financial
Annapolis Bancorp
Associated Banc-Corp
Bancorp Rhode Island
BancTrust Financial Group
Bank of America
Bank of Commerce Holdings
Bank of Marin Bancorp
Bank of New York Mellon
Bank of North Carolina
Bank of the Ozarks
Banner Corp
Bar Harbor Bankshares
BB&T
BCSB Bancorp
Berkshire Hills Bancorp
Boston Private Financial
Holdings
Bridge Capital Holdings
C&F Financial Corp
Capital Bank
Capital One Financial Corp.
Carolina Bank Holdings
Carver Bancorp
Cathay General Bancorp
Center Bancorp
CenterState Banks of Florida,
Inc.
Central Bancorp
Central Valley Community
Bancorp
Citigroup
Citizens & Northern Corporation
Citizens First Corp
Citizens Republic Bancorp
Citizens South Banking Corp

Disbursed
Date
12/23/2008
01/23/2009
12/19/2008
11/21/2008
12/19/2008
01/30/2009
11/21/2008
12/19/2008
12/19/2008
10/28/2008
11/14/2008
12/05/2008
10/28/2008
12/05/2008
12/12/2008
11/21/2008
01/16/2009
11/14/2008
12/23/2008
12/19/2008
11/21/2008

Disbursed
Amount
12000000
111000000
26918000
52000000
21000000
8152000
525000000
30000000
50000000
45000000000
17000000
28000000
3000000000
31260000
75000000
124000000
18751000
3133640000
10800000
40000000
154000000

Returned
Date
10/27/2010
12/29/2010
05/13/2009
06/13/2012
08/11/2011
04/18/2012
04/06/2011
08/05/2009
05/29/2012
12/09/2009
09/27/2011
03/31/2009
06/09/2009
08/23/2012
11/04/2009
03/28/2012
02/24/2010
06/09/2009
01/26/2011
05/27/2009
01/10/2010

Returned
Amount
12000000
111000000
26918000
47665332
21000000
4076000
8152000
525000000
50000000
45000000000
17000000
28000000
3000000000
28365685
75000000
108071915
18751000
3133640000
10800000
40000000
50000000

12/23/2008
01/09/2009
12/12/2008
11/14/2008
01/09/2009
01/16/2009
12/05/2008
01/09/2009
11/21/2008

23864000
20000000
41279000
3555199000
16000000
18980000
258000000
10000000
27875000

02/23/1011
07/27/2011
01/28/2011
12/03/2009
02/20/2013
08/27/2010
03/20/1013
09/15/2011
09/30/2009

23864000
10000000
41279000
3555199000
14811984
18980000
129000000
10000000
27875000

12/05/2008
01/30/2009

10000000
7000000

09/01/2011
08/18/2011

10000000
7000000

10/28/2008
01/16/2009
12/19/2008
12/12/2008
12/12/2008

45000000000
26440000
8779000
300000000
20500000

12/23/2009
08/04/2010
02/16/2011
09/13/2012
09/22/2011

20000000000
26440000
2212308
300000000
20500000
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Name
City National
CoBiz Financial
Codorus Valley Bancorp
Columbia Banking System
Comerica Incorporated
Community Bankers Trust Corp
Community Financial Corp
Community Partners Bancorp
Connecticut Bank and Trust
Company
CVB Financial
Eagle Bancorp
East West Bancorp, Inc.
Eastern Virginia Bankshares
Elmira Savings Bank
Enterprise Financial Services
Corp
F.N.B. Corporation
Fidelity Bancorp, Inc.
Fidelity Southern Corp
Fifth Third Bancorp
Financial Institutions
First Bancorp
First Busey Corporation
First Capital Bancorp
First Citizens Banc Corp
First Community Bancshares
First Community Corp
First Defiance Financial Corp
First Financial Bancorp
First Financial Holdings
First Horizon National
First M&F Corp
First Merchants Corp
First Midwest Bancorp
First Niagara
First PacTrust Bancorp, Inc.
Firstbank Corp
FirstMerit Corp
Flagstar Bancorp
Flushing Financial Corp
Fulton Financial Corp
Goldman Sachs

Disbursed
Date
11/21/2008
12/19/2008
01/09/2009
11/21/2008
11/14/2008
12/19/2008
12/19/2008
01/30/2009
12/19/2008

Disbursed
Amount
400000000
64450000
16500000
76898000
2250000000
17680000
12643000
9000000
5448000

Returned
Date
12/30/2009
09/08/2011
08/18/2011
08/11/2010
03/17/2010
07/24/2013
01/09/2013
08/11/2011
10/25/2011

Returned
Amount
400000000
64450000
16500000
76898000
2250000000
7000000
12643000
9000000
5448000

12/05/2008
12/05/2008
12/05/2008
01/09/2009
12/19/2008
12/19/2008

130000000
38235000
306546000
24000000
9090000
35000000

09/02/2009
12/23/2009
12/29/2010
10/18/2013
08/25/2011
11/07/2012

130000000
15000000
306546000
24000000
9090000
35000000

01/09/2009
12/12/2008
12/19/2008
12/31/2008
12/23/2008
01/09/2009
03/06/2009
04/03/2009
01/23/2009
11/21/2008
11/21/2008
12/05/2008
12/23/2008
12/05/2008
11/14/2008
02/27/2009
02/20/2009
12/05/2008
11/21/2008
11/21/2008
01/30/2009
01/09/2009
01/30/2009
12/19/2008
12/23/2008
10/28/2008

100000000
7000000
48200000
3408000000
37515000
65000000
100000000
10958000
23184000
41500000
11350000
37000000
80000000
65000000
866540000
30000000
116000000
193000000
184011000
19300000
33000000
125000000
266657000
70000000
376500000
10000000000

09/09/2009
07/19/2012
06/27/2012
02/02/2011
02/23/2011
09/01/2011
08/25/2011
06/13/2012
06/27/2012
07/08/2009
08/23/2012
06/13/2012
02/24/2010
03/28/2012
12/22/2010
02/07/2013
09/22/2011
11/23/2011
05/27/2009
12/15/2010
06/27/2012
04/22/2009
03/27/2013
10/28/2009
07/14/2010
06/09/2009

100000000
7000000
42757786
3408000000
37515000
65000000
100000000
9931327
20689633
41500000
10987794
35084144
80000000
55926478
866540000
30000000
116000000
193000000
184011000
19300000
30587530
125000000
240627277
70000000
376500000
10000000000
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Name
Great Southern Bancorp
Green Bankshares
Guaranty Federal Bancshares
Hawthorn Bancshares
Heartland Financial USA
Heritage Commerce Corp
Heritage Financial Corp
Heritage Oaks Bancorp
HF Financial Corp
HMN Financial
Home BancShares, Inc.
HopFed Bancorp
Horizon Bancorp
Huntington Bancshares
IBERIABANK Corp
Independent Bank Corp
Independent Bank Corporation
Indiana Community Bancorp
International Bancshares
Corporation
Intervest Bancshares
JPMorgan Chase
KeyCorp
Lakeland Bancorp
Lakeland Financial Corporation
LNB Bancorp
LSB Corp
M&T Bank Corporation
Mackinac Financial Corporation
MainSource Financial Group
MB Financial
Mercantile Bank Corporation
MetroCorp Bancshares
Mid Penn Bancorp
Middleburg Financial Corp
MidSouth Bancorp
MidWest One Financial Group
Monarch Financial Holdings
Morgan Stanley
MutualFirst Financial
Nara Bancorp
National Penn Bancshares
NewBridge Bancorp Bancshares

Disbursed
Date
12/05/2008
12/23/2008
01/30/2009
12/19/2008
12/19/2008
11/21/2008
11/21/2008
03/20/2009
11/21/2008
12/23/2008
01/16/2009
12/12/2008
12/19/2008
11/14/2008
12/05/2008
01/09/2009
12/12/2008
12/12/2008
12/23/2008

Disbursed
Amount
58000000
72278000
17000000
30255000
81698000
40000000
24000000
21000000
25000000
26000000
50000000
18400000
25000000
1398071000
90000000
78158000
72000000
21500000
216000000

Returned
Date
08/18/2011
09/07/2011
06/13/2012
05/09/2012
09/15/2011
03/07/2012
12/22/2010
07/17/2013
06/03/2009
02/08/2013
07/06/2011
12/19/2012
11/10/2010
12/22/2010
03/31/2009
04/22/2009
08/30/2013
09/12/2012
07/11/2011

Returned
Amount
58000000
68700000
5000000
12000000
81698000
40000000
24000000
21000000
25000000
18571410
50000000
18400000
6250000
1398071000
90000000
78158000
72000000
21500000
216000000

12/23/2008
10/28/2008
11/14/2008
02/06/2009
02/27/2009
12/12/2008
12/12/2008
12/23/2008
04/24/2009
01/16/2009
12/05/2008
05/15/2009
01/16/2009
12/19/2008
01/30/2009
01/09/2009
02/06/2009
12/19/2008
10/28/2008
12/23/2008
11/21/2008
12/12/2008
12/12/2008

25000000
25000000000
2500000000
59000000
56044000
25223000
15000000
600000000
11000000
57000000
196000000
21000000
45000000
10000000
22000000
20000000
16000000
14700000
10000000000
32382000
67000000
150000000
52372000

06/24/2013
06/09/2009
03/30/2011
08/04/2010
06/09/2010
06/13/2012
11/18/2009
05/18/2011
08/23/2012
03/28/2012
03/14/2012
06/06/2012
06/27/2012
12/28/2012
12/23/2009
08/25/2011
07/06/2011
12/23/2009
06/09/2009
08/25/2011
06/27/2012
03/16/2011
04/29/2013

24007500
25000000000
2500000000
20000000
56044000
21863750
15000000
370000000
10380905
52277171
196000000
21000000
43490360
10000000
22000000
20000000
16000000
14700000
10000000000
32382000
67000000
150000000
50837239
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Name
North Central Bancshares
Northeast Bancorp
Northern Trust
OceanFirst Financial Corp
Old Line Bancshares
Old National Bancorp
Park National Corporation
Parke Bancorp
Parkvale Financial Corp
Pathfinder Bancorp, Inc.
Peapack-Gladstone Financial
Peoples Bancorp Inc.
Peoples Bancorp of North
Carolina
Pinnacle Financial
Plumas Bancorp
PNC Financial Services
Premier Financial Bancorp, Inc.
PremierWest Bancorp
PrivateBancorp
Pulaski Financial Corp
QCR Holdings
Regions Financial Corp.
S&T Bancorp
Salisbury Bancorp
Sandy Spring Bancorp
SCBT Financial Corp
Severn Bancorp
Shore Bancshares
Signature Bank
Somerset Hills Bancorp
Southern Community Financial
Southern First Bancshares
Southern Missouri Bancorp
Southwest Bancorp
State Bancorp
State Street
StellarOne Corp
Sterling Bancorp
Stewardship Financial Corp
Summit State Bank
Sun Bancorp

Disbursed
Date
01/09/2009
12/12/2008
11/14/2008
01/16/2009
12/05/2008
12/12/2008
12/23/2008
01/30/2009
12/23/2008
09/11/2009
01/09/2009
01/30/2009
12/23/2008

Disbursed
Amount
10200000
4227000
1576000000
38263000
7000000
100000000
100000000
16288000
31762000
6771000
28685000
39000000
25054000

Returned
Date
12/14/2011
11/28/2012
06/09/2009
12/30/2009
07/15/2009
03/31/2009
04/25/2012
11/30/2012
06/15/2011
09/01/2011
01/06/2010
02/02/2011
06/27/2012

Returned
Amount
10200000
4227000
1576000000
38263000
7000000
100000000
100000000
11595735
31762000
6771000
7172000
21000000
23033635

12/12/2008
01/30/2009
12/31/2008
10/02/2009
02/13/2009
01/30/2009
01/16/2009
02/13/2009
11/14/2008
01/16/2009
03/13/2009
12/05/2008
01/16/2009
11/21/2008
01/09/2009
12/12/2008
01/16/2009
12/05/2008
02/27/2009
12/05/2008
12/05/2008
12/05/2008
10/28/2008
12/19/2008
12/23/2008
01/30/2009
12/19/2008
01/09/2009

95000000
11949000
7579200000
22252000
41400000
243815000
32538000
38237000
3500000000
108676000
8816000
83094000
64779000
23393000
25000000
120000000
7414000
42750000
17299000
9550000
70000000
36842000
2000000000
30000000
42000000
10000000
8500000
89310000

12/28/2011
05/03/2013
02/10/2010
07/27/2012
12/14/2012
10/24/2012
06/27/2012
09/15/2011
04/04/2012
12/07/2011
08/25/2011
07/21/2010
05/20/2009
09/25/2013
04/15/2009
03/31/2009
05/20/2009
03/27/2012
06/27/2012
07/21/2011
08/08/2012
12/14/2011
06/09/2009
04/13/2011
04/27/2011
09/01/2011
08/04/2011
04/08/2009

23750000
11949000
7579200000
19849222
41400000
243815000
28460338
38237000
3500000000
108676000
8816000
83094000
64779000
23367267
25000000
120000000
7414000
42750000
15403722
9550000
70000000
36842000
2000000000
7500000
42000000
10000000
8500000
89310000
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Name

Disbursed
Date
11/14/2008
12/12/2008
12/12/2008
12/19/2008
11/21/2008
11/14/2008
01/16/2009
12/12/2008
01/09/2009
12/23/2008
12/12/2008
11/21/2008
11/14/2008
11/14/2008
12/19/1008

Disbursed
Amount
4850000000
300000000
235000000
967870000
104823000
361172000
75000000
45220000
25000000
16641000
76458000
215000000
6599000000
214181000
92900000

SunTrust
Susquehanna Bancshares
SVB Financial Group
Synovus Financial Corp.
Taylor Capital
TCF Financial
Texas Capital Bancshares
The Bancorp
The First Bancorp
Timberland Bancorp
TowneBank
Trustmark Corp
U.S. Bancorp
Umpqua
Union First Market Bankshares
Corporation
United Community Banks
12/05/2008
180000000
Unity Bancorp
12/05/2008
20649000
Valley Financial Corp
12/12/2008
16019000
Valley National
11/14/2008
300000000
Virginia Commerce Bancorp
12/12/2008
71000000
VIST Financial Corp
12/19/2008
25000000
Washington Banking Company
01/16/2009
26380000
Washington Federal Inc.
11/14/2008
200000000
Webster Financial
11/21/2008
400000000
Wells Fargo
10/28/2008
25000000000
WesBanco
12/05/2008
75000000
West Bancorporation
12/31/2008
36000000
Westamerica Bancorporation
02/13/2009
83726000
Western Alliance
11/21/2008
140000000
Bancorporation
Wilshire Bancorp
12/12/2008
62158000
Wintrust Financial Corp
12/19/2008
250000000
WSFS Financial
01/23/2009
52625000
Yadkin Valley Financial Corp
01/16/2009
49312000
Zions Bancorp
11/14/2008
1400000000
Source: http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/category/Bank
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Returned
Date
03/30/2011
04/21/2010
12/23/2009
07/26/2013
06/13/2012
04/22/2009
05/13/2009
03/10/2010
08/24/2011
11/13/2012
09/22/2011
12/09/2009
06/09/2009
02/17/2010
11/18/2009

Returned
Amount
4850000000
200000000
235000000
967870000
92254460
361172000
75000000
45220000
12500000
14412687
76458000
215000000
6599000000
214181000
59000000

03/28/2013
05/15/2013
11/14/2012
06/03/2009
12/11/2012
01/26/2012
01/12/2011
05/27/2009
03/03/2010
12/23/2009
09/09/2009
06/29/2011
09/02/1009
09/27/2011

171517500
20649000
16019000
300000000
71000000
25000000
26380000
200000000
100000000
25000000000
75000000
36000000
83726000
140000000

03/28/2012
12/22/2010
03/28/2012
09/12/2012
03/28/2012

57766994
250000000
47435299
43486820
700000000

Table 2. Definition of Variables Used to Analyze Bank Performance
This table lists the ratio names and definitions used to examine bank performance during the
period from 2008Q4 to 2013Q4. Quarterly data are obtained from Compustat data base based on
banks ticker. For each observation, pre-event quarterly data is employed.
1 Return on assets
Net income after tax divided by total assets
2 Tier 1 capital ratio
Risk-adjusted tier 1 capital divided by total assets
3 Liquidity ratio
Cash and short-term investment divided by total assets
4 Net-charge offs to total assets
The reported amount of asset write-downs minus
recoveries of previous write downs and then divided
by total assets
5 Nonperforming asset to total
loans and other assets that are 90 days or greater past
due divided by total assets
assets
6 Provisions for loan to total asset
Charged against earnings to establish a reserve
sufficient to
absorb expected loan losses based upon knowledge of
the loan portfolio divided by total assets
7 Common share issued to total
Common share issued divided by total assets
assets
8 Repayment amount to total
Repayment amount for each event window divided by
total assets
assets
9 Merger
Dummy variable equals to one if the bank was merged
otherwise zero
10 lnassets
the natural logarithm of total assets
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
This table shows the descriptive statistics of selected control variables for “one-time-only-banks”
which are banks with one repayment and for “multiple-times-banks” which are banks with
multiple repayments. The last column reports the difference in mean between the two groups. ***,
**, and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
raw variable
($ million)
Total assets
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"
lnassets
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"
Ratio variable
(%)
Return on assets
(ROA)
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"
Tier 1 capital
ratio
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"
Liquidity ratio
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"
Net-charge offs
to total assets
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"

mean

median

s.deviation

Maximum

Minimum

T-test in
mean (P
value)

55001.39

2214.31

262168.50

2251043.00

284.18

-0.68

99168.03

2583.28

410.392.30

1888599.00

349.73

(0.50)

8.16

7.70

1.80

14.63

5.65

-0.44

8.35

7.86

1.99

5.86

14.45

(0.66)

mean

median

s.deviation

Maximum

Minimum

T-test in
mean (P
value)

0.17

0.17

0.41

3.14

-2.11

-0.25

0.19

0.17

0.18

0.70

-0.08

(0.80)

13.80

13.46

3.37

31.13

6.99

-0.68

14.30

14.40

2.02

17.69

9.76

(0.50)

6.65

5.01

5.96

38.10

0.71

0.43

6.03

4.23

5.89

26.00

1.02

(0.67)

-0.17

-0.14

0.18

0.18

-1.27

-0.25

-0.16

-0.13

0.12

0

-0.40

(0.80)
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Ratio variable
(%)
Nonperforming
asset to total
assets
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"
Provisions for
loan to total
assets
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"
Common share
issued to total
assets
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"
Repayment
amount to total
assets
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"
Dummy variable
Merger
"one-time-onlybanks"
"multiple-timesbanks"

mean

median

s.deviation

Maximum

Minimum

T-test in
mean (P
value)

2.57

1.98

2.42

20.52

0.00

1.50

1.79

1.80

1.18

6.06

0.00

(0.13)

0.16

0.12

0.18

1.26

-0.22

0.01

0.16

0.16

0.13

0.40

0.00

(0.99)

0.82

0.71

0.51

3.45

0.08

0.80

0.73

0.71

0.31

1.22

0.18

(0.43)

92.72

1.66

688.56

8797.15

0.00

0.58

5.24

1.78

8.91

38.14

0.00

(0.56)

mean

median

s.deviation

Maximum

Minimum

T-test in
mean (P
value)

0.11

0.00

0.32

1.00

0.00

0.93

0.05

0.00

0.22

1.00

0.00

(0.35)
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of CAR
This table reports the descriptive Statistics cumulative abnormal return during three-day window
(-1, 1) on each event date using the market model for each of “one-time-only-banks” which are
banks with one repayment and for each of “multiple-times-banks” which are banks with multiple
repayments. Benchmark period is the previous quarter from the event date and only actively
involved in TARP companies are included in the sample. The last column reports the difference
in mean between the two groups. ***, **, and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
confidence level, respectively.
variable

mean

media
n

s.deviation

CAR
"one-timeonly-banks"

0.0160***

0.0034

0.0012

0.2630

-0.0298

13.2426
(0.0000)

0.0023

0.0002

0.0037

0.0544

-0.0302

0.6190
(0.5429)

"multipletimes-banks"
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Maximum

Minimu
m

T-test for
CAR (p-value)

Table 5 Event Study Results
This table reports the comparison analysis results of average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR)
during three-day window (-1, 1) for the entire group of “one-time-only-banks” which are banks
with one repayment and for the entire group of “multiple-times-banks” which are banks with
multiple repayments. The market model is used to estimation. The results of average cumulative
abnormal return (ACAR) split by the median level of financial controlled variables (Return on
assets, Tier 1 capital ratio, Liquidity ratio, Net-charge offs to total assets, Nonperforming asset to
total assets, Provisions for loan to total asset, Common share issued to total assets, Repayment
amount to total assets), the five size level of Total assets and two true or false level of one dummy
(Merger) in the previous quarter. Benchmark period is the previous quarter from the event date
and only actively involved in TARP companies are included in the sample. I use t-test to test
whether average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) is significantly different to zero. ***, **,
and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
one-time-only-banks
variables

Multiple-times-banks

ACAR

ACAR

total asset(million)
<500

0.0223

**

(0.0066)
500-1000

0.0222

(0.0055)
***

(0.0035)
1000-3000

0.0186

0.0178

***

0.0015
(0.0028)
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0.0087
(0.0083)

***

(0.0018)
>10000

0.0024
(0.0069)

(0.0020)
3000-10000

-0.0061

0.0144
(0.150)

***

0.0209
(0.0118)

one-time-only-banks
variables

Multiple-times-banks

ACAR

ACAR

Return on assets
<=median

0.0233

***

(0.0018)
>median

0.0087

-0.0038
(0.0051)

***

(0.0016)

0.0089
(0.0052)

Repayment amount to total
assets
<=median

0.0193

***

(0.0018)
>median

0.0127

0.0045
(0.0047)

***

(0.0017)

-0.0002
(0.0057)

merger
independence

0.0082

***

(0.0012)
merger

0.0767

0.0023
(0.0036)

***

(0.0045)

0.0015
(0.0269)

Common share issued to
total assets
<=median

0.0192

***

(0.0016)
>median

0.0130
(0.0018)

35

0.0057
(0.0065)

***

-0.0008
(0.0037)

one-time-only-banks
variables

Multiple-times-banks

ACAR

ACAR

Provisions for loan to total
asset
<=median

0.0130

***

(0.0016)
>median

0.0192

0.0058
(0.0057)

***

(0.0018)

0.0010
(0.0047)

Net-charge offs to total
assets
<=median

0.0149

***

(0.0017)
>median

0.0172

0.0033
(0.0045)

***

(0.0017)

0.0012
(0.0058)

Nonperforming asset to total
assets
<=median

0.0158

***

(0.0016)
>median

0.0163

0.0037
(0.0048)

***

(0.0018)

0.0009
(0.0054)

Liquidity ratio
<=median

0.0148

***

(0.0017)
>median

0.0173
(0.0018)

36

-0.0004
(0.0064)

***

0.0047
(0.0039)

one-time-only-banks
variables

Multiple-times-banks

ACAR

ACAR

Tier 1 capital ratio
<=median

0.0269

***

(0.0019)
>median

0.0051
(0.0016)

37

-0.0065
(0.0057)

***

0.0119
(0.0044)

**

Table 6 Regression Results
This table reports the result of cross-sectional regression for “one-time-only-banks” which are
banks with one repayment and for “multiple-times-banks” which are banks with multiple
repayments. In this table, cumulative abnormal return for each bank is used as a dependent
variable. Average cumulative abnormal returns are estimated by using market model during a
three-day window (-1, 1) on each event date. Benchmark period is the previous one year from the
event date and only actively involved in TARP companies are included in the sample. ***,**, and
* indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Variables
One-time-only
Multiple-times
lnassets
-0.0007
0.0098
(0.0022)
(0.0035)
Return on assets (ROA)

-1.6823**
(0.8576)

10.8133***
(2.4324)

Tier 1 capital ratio

-0.0016
(0.0010)

0.0018
(0.0019)

Liquidity ratio

-0.0580
(0.0560)

0.2651
(0.1315)

Net-charge offs to total assets

4.4689
(2.8466)

-0.4817
(6.5857)

Nonperforming asset to total assets

0.0450
(0.1442)

-0.2547
(0.4846)

Provisions for loan to total asset

0.7907
(3.1473)

-1.4657
(6.4255)

Common share issued to total assets

-0.5350
(0.6468)

-2.5665
(1.4124)

Repayment amount to total assets

-0.0002
(0.0005)

-0.2654
(0.0588)

Merger

0.0660***
(0.0103)

-0.0068
(0.0176)

Number of obs
F statistics

175
6.20

21
3.92

Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

0.00
0.27
0.23
0.04

0.0210
0.7966
0.5932
0.0140
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FIGURES
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Figure 1 Distribution of TARP Issuance Frequency by Quarter
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Figure 2 Distribution of TARP Issuance Amount by Quarter
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Figure 3 Distribution of TARP Repayment Frequency by Quarter
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Figures 4 Distribution of TARP Repayment Amount by Quarter
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